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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-3452

CARL DWAYNE CRAWFORD,
Appellant
v.
EDWARD M. FRIMEL; VITO D. ROSELLI;
KEITH R. HOLDSWORTH; MICHAEL CARBONELL;
KEVIN MCSHANE; JAMES R. MELINSON

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:05-cv-00118)
District Judge: Honorable Freda Wolfson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 02, 2009)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Appellant Carl Dwayne Crawford, a federal prisoner, appeals the District Court’s
order of March 19, 2007, denying his motions for leave to amend the complaint and for

appointment of counsel, and the District Court’s order of June 26, 2007, dismissing his
complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I. Background
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will set forth briefly only
those facts necessary to our analysis.
On January 16, 2003, two black males disguised in traditional female Muslim garb
committed an armed robbery at a bank located a few blocks away from Crawford’s
apartment. Witnesses observed the perpetrators leave the scene in a green Chevrolet
Malibu. After officers located the Malibu and established surveillance of it, Crawford
was observed driving another individual, Luzerne Faulkner, to the Malibu. A bank
employee identified Crawford as having inquired a few days earlier about opening an
account; the employee found him suspicious because Crawford did not provide
identification and was asking strange questions. Crawford was arrested by agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) on suspicion of armed bank robbery.
The next day, FBI agents sought a warrant in order to search Crawford’s apartment
for evidence of the bank robbery, including female Muslim clothing, firearms, and bank
wrappers. Magistrate Judge James Melinson issued the warrant. The search yielded a
gun, illegal drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Based on the results of the search, Crawford
was charged with drug and firearm-related crimes.1

1

Crawford was tried and acquitted of the charges relating to the bank robbery.
2

At his criminal trial, Crawford sought to suppress the evidence gathered during the
search of his apartment. He argued that the FBI lacked probable cause for his arrest and
the search. After a hearing, the District Court denied Crawford’s motion, holding that
there was probable cause for both the arrest and the search. On November 5, 2004, a jury
convicted Crawford. This Court upheld the conviction on direct appeal, affirming that
there was probable cause for both the arrest and the search. The Supreme Court denied
Crawford’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
On December 24, 2004, while his direct appeal was pending, Crawford executed a
pro se complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against five FBI agents and Magistrate Judge Melinson,
claiming that they conspired to violate his constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, he alleged that there was no probable cause for
the arrest and the search of his apartment.2 In addition to monetary damages, he sought
immediate release from prison and expungement of his criminal record.
On August 14, 2006, Crawford filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15, seeking to amend his complaint in order to add additional defendants,
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On appeal, Crawford raises what appear to be new constitutional claims, including,
for example, that the Defendants violated his Equal Protection rights and employed
excessive force against him. However, his Bivens complaint did not assert any of these
claims and it does not appear that he raised these arguments before the District Court.
Absent compelling circumstances, this Court generally declines to consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal. Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int.
Union, 266 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2001).
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including the District Court Judge who presided over his criminal trial, the Assistant
United States Attorney who prosecuted him, and several more FBI agents. He also filed a
motion for appointment of counsel. On March 19, 2007, the District Court denied both
motions. The District Court denied appointment of counsel primarily because Crawford
failed to show that his claims had arguable merit. In denying leave to amend, the District
Court explained that the claims against the proposed new defendants were time-barred
because they were filed more than three years after the allegedly unlawful search. The
claims did not relate back to the date of the original filing because the motion to amend
was submitted more than 120 days after the complaint was filed and the new defendants
were not given notice that an action would be brought against them. In addition, the
District Court observed that Crawford did not provide any reason why he did not identify
the additional defendants at an earlier date.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. On June
26, 2007, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion. The District Court
concluded that Crawford’s challenge to the legality of the search of his apartment was
barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and by collateral estoppel.3
This timely pro se appeal followed.
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The District Court did not state its reasons for dismissing the unlawful arrest claim,
although Defendants had argued in their motion to dismiss that the unlawful arrest claim
was also barred by Heck and collateral estoppel.
4

II. Analysis
We first address the District Court’s order dismissing Crawford’s complaint. We
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).
Under Heck, a prisoner may not bring a civil rights suit if its success would render
invalid a conviction that has not been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Lora-Pena v. F.B.I.,
529 F.3d 503, 506 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that Heck applies to Bivens
claims). In determining whether a Fourth Amendment claim is subject to Heck, a district
court must assess whether the allegations of constitutional error necessarily imply the
invalidity of the conviction or sentence. See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J Dep’t of
Law and Public Safety–Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006). Our review of the record confirms the District Court’s
determination that Crawford’s claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.
The facts implicating Crawford in the bank robbery gave rise to the probable cause
to arrest him on suspicion of bank robbery and to search his apartment. But for the search
of his apartment, the gun, drugs, and drug paraphernalia underlying his drug conviction
would not have been seized. If the seized items were to be suppressed by reason of the
illegality of the search, the conviction could not stand. Indeed, Crawford expressly seeks
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to overturn his conviction through his Bivens action.4 Because Crawford’s complaint
directly attacks the factual basis for his conviction, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that it is barred by Heck.
In addition, the District Court found the claims barred by collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Jean Alexander Cosmetics v.
L’Oreal USA, 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 27 (1982)).5
On appeal, Crawford argues that there was no probable cause for his arrest and the
search of his apartment. Crawford previously and unsuccessfully litigated these issues
during the course of his criminal proceedings in his motion to suppress. See Transcript,
Jan. 6, 2004, at 38-39. On direct appeal, Crawford again argued that there was no
probable cause for the arrest and search. Again, this Court affirmed that “[t]he record
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Such relief is not available in a civil rights action.
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Various courts have acknowledged that collateral estoppel may be asserted to
preclude a defense to a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Matthews v. Macanas, 990 F.2d 467, 468
(9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Pascual v. Matsumura, 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (D. Haw. 2001); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 443 (7th Cir.
1988); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding that collateral
estoppel is a defense to a Fourth Amendment claim brought under § 1983 where the issue
underlying the claim was previously litigated in a state habeas proceeding).
6

reveals that there was probable cause for both the arrest and the subsequent search of the
apartment.” United States v. Crawford, C.A. No. 04-4249 (3d Cir. Oct. 20, 2005). Thus,
Crawford is precluded from pursuing the probable cause issue in his Bivens complaint.
We next examine the District Court’s denial of Crawford’s motions for leave to
amend his complaint and for appointment of counsel. We review both decisions for
abuse of discretion. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).
In his motion to amend, Crawford sought to “add[ ] to the front of
complaint/action” the names of six FBI agents whose names Crawford had previously
mentioned only in the body of his complaint.6 He also sought to add two “new additional
defendants/witnesses” – specifically, District Judge McLaughlin, who had presided over
Crawford’s criminal trial, and Assistant United States Attorney Chun, who had
represented the Government in prosecuting Crawford’s criminal case.7 Crawford did not
seek to raise any additional or different legal theories against these or any defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading
“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However,
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The FBI agents were: Marx, Pelczar, Crowley, Scanzano, Kitzinger, and Stewart.
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In his brief, Crawford argues that he did not include these defendants at the outset
because he “unconsciously overlooked both issues that are imperative while hastily trying
to file his civil rights complaint.” Although Crawford initiated his Bivens action in early
2005 and did not file his motion to amend until August 2006, his explanation for the delay
is that “he forgot to file this Motion because appellant had other issues occurring.”
7

leave to amend need not be granted where amendment would be futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,
116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). As previously discussed, Crawford’s claims were properly
dismissed as barred by Heck and by collateral estoppel. Adding additional defendants
would have no impact upon this outcome. Thus, Crawford’s requested amendment would
be futile. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (explaining that judges generally
have absolute immunity for the judicial actions taken in the course of judicial
proceedings). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crawford leave
to amend his complaint to add additional defendants.
The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel.
Crawford failed to establish the threshold Tabron consideration: that his case likely had
merit. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. No remaining Tabron consideration mandated a
different result. See id. at 156.
Finally, Crawford has filed a motion in this Court, seeking a default judgment
against Appellees for failure to submit a supplemental appendix. Such relief is not
available under the federal rules. Moreover, the docket reflects that Appellees filed a
supplemental appendix on January 29, 2009, and served a copy upon Crawford via mail.
We will deny the motion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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